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Abstract 
China has developed its own domestic carbon markets by setting up emission trading 
schemes. This study addresses concerns about the functioning of these schemes and 
the financial performance of the Chinese carbon market. It aims to assess an actual 
outcome of this policy intervention, i.e. trading records, which were used in our 
analysis to examine a key financial property of the allowance-based market in 
Shenzhen. In a mature market, assets that incur higher risks are likely to yield higher 
returns, i.e. a positive relationship. To examine this property, we solicited historical 
data on the price and trading volume of emission allowances. We statistically 
estimated the degree of volatility in the Shenzhen market and its relationship with 
expected return premium. We found that the rate of return was negatively 
associated with expected risk. This stands at odds with the usual expectation in the 
financial market and the prediction of asset pricing theory. Also, kurtosis in trading 
volume was excessively high and its fluctuations were highly concentrated. We 
discuss these findings in terms of market liquidity and information uncertainties, and 
offer some policy recommendations. More regulatory attention and economic fixes 
are needed to improve market efficiency and eliminate sources of market 
distortions.    
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1. Introduction 
According to the International Energy Agency [1], carbon emissions from fuel 
combustion rose from 26,177Mt in 2004 to 32,190Mt in 2013 (up 23%). To keep 
global temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, substantial 
cuts in these emissions are required, i.e. globally 40 to 70 per cent lower in 2050 
than in 2010 [2]. The People’s Republic of China is the largest carbon emitter, 
contributing to 28 per cent of the world’s total in 2013 [1]. 
 New policy instruments are being introduced in China to strengthen its efforts 
on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. The past ten years have seen its climate policy 
preference shifting from the conventional ‘command-and-control’ approach towards 
a market-based one [3-10]. The recent arrival of emission trading schemes (ETS) in 
seven provinces and municipalities of China marked a watershed in the history of 
Chinese climate policy [11, 12]. 
 Emission trading involves a regulatory body setting an aggregate limit on the 
level of the regulated emissions, such as GHGs, and issuing permissions to pollute up 
to that limit. Entities covered by an ETS must hold enough emission allowances for 
the amount of the emissions they produce. These allowances represent a cost of 
production and can be exchanged among entities, and therefore have market value. 
Those entities who can reduce emissions at lower costs sell excess allowances, 
whereas those who find it more costly to reduce pollution buy allowances. The 
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trading of allowances effectively creates a market institution, commonly known as 
‘carbon market’.   
Seventeen ETSs are operating in various national or subnational jurisdictions, 
covering about 8 per cent of annual global GHG emissions (as of August 2015)[13]. 
The implementation of ETSs by China is regarded as a decisive move towards 
effective GHG mitigation with global impacts. The seven pilot ETSs in China 
combined form the world’s second largest carbon market, after the European Union 
(EU) ETS. Indicative estimates provided by World Bank [13, p.9] suggest that global 
GHG emissions covered by carbon pricing initiatives will almost double if a national 
ETS is implemented in China. However, concern and discussion have been raised 
within China about the shortcomings and timing of nationwide emission trading 
[14-18].  
The use of market-based instruments for controlling GHG emissions is a 
rather novel attempt in China, which is far from a mature market economy [4, 6, 7, 9, 
19-21]. Liu, Chen [21] have noted that, for example, China’s financial sector has 
experienced systematic distortions due to excessive state intervention in the market, 
dominance of state-owned enterprises, and official state control over utility prices. 
The domestic carbon market in China, predicated upon the pilot ETSs, has 
reproduced these limitations [18], leading to low market liquidity and efficiency [12, 
14, 22]. These alarming realities might result in poor performance or even the 
collapse of the Chinese national ETS that is scheduled to commence in or shortly 
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after 2017. Such a possible outcome would pose financial risks to the international 
carbon market in which China is likely to become a key player and consequently 
impede global efforts on GHG mitigation. New research is needed to build an 
empirical basis for understanding and evaluating this major policy intervention in 
China. 
 The present research sought further evidence on the functioning of Chinese ETSs, 
focusing on financial performance. Many studies have addressed their regulatory 
and management aspects, and come to the conclusion that the pilot designs meet 
with many challenges [9, 21, 23]. Only a handful of them, however, have explored 
the market outcomes of this policy intervention. In fact, few developing countries, 
namely China and Kazakhstan, have established their own carbon market that is built 
upon domestic legislation and designated to achieve domestic policy goals, due to 
their hitherto low capacity and motivation to create one. This results in a lack of 
knowledge about the performance of carbon markets in these countries.  
According to the International Carbon Action Partnership [24], a growing 
number of developing economies, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, 
have expressed an interest in setting up a sectoral cap-and-trade system for pricing 
carbon. Our study can help identify the potential weaknesses of these emerging 
carbon markets from a financial perspective. Lessons from China can make 
significant contributions to the scholarly debates about these new developments, 
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given that it is currently the only developing economy having established a domestic 
ETS (the Kazakhstan ETS is temporarily suspended) [24].  
The present research offers new insights by studying an actual outcome (i.e. 
market transactions) and examining a key financial property of a sub-national carbon 
market in China. Our objective was to estimate the degree of volatility in this market 
and its relationship with expected return premium, which can reflect the efficiency 
of a financial market [25, 26]. Trading records provide a statistical basis for assessing 
the financial maturity of markets. We solicited data on the price and trading volume 
of emission allowances traded under a pilot ETS since 2013. 
Shenzhen, a megacity in South China, was selected as a case study because of 
its representativeness. The Shenzhen ETS is the first centrally approved scheme 
launched in China with the most extensive records on allowance price. Moreover, 
Shenzhen ETS is the first one in China granted a formal legislative basis [21], and 
regarded as more market-oriented, active, and properly designed than the other six 
sub-national carbon markets in China [27, p.19 and p.54]. Therefore, the Shenzhen 
ETS could act as a role model and offer lessons for other mandatory ETSs in the 
pipeline. Our inquiry can shed lights on the performance of this carbon market, 
through which to inform the ongoing debates as to what need to be addressed in 
order to overcome its imperfections as China and other developing economies 
pursue their carbon pricing initiatives.   
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We begin by providing an overview of the economic context in which the 
Chinese ETSs are situated and a brief description of Shenzhen City. The section that 
follows explains our main hypothesis and describes how data were collected. The 
novelty of this research lies in the use of an established econometric technique, 
known as ‘generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity’ (GARCH) model, 
for analysing Chinese carbon price data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to systematically examine these data using GARCH model and compare with 
the European experiences on this basis. After describing the data collection 
approach, we provide details about this technique. Results are then presented, and 
their implications are discussed in the last two sections.   
  
2. Background 
2.1 Recent financial market events in China 
Emission trading has enabled the financial market to put a price on the right to emit 
GHGs into the atmosphere [28, 29]. The financial market in China began to flourish in 
the early 1980s, following a progressive policy direction that aimed to ‘reform and 
open-up’ the obsolete planned economy. Over-the-counter and negotiated deals 
dominated this market in the first few years. The secondary market was made active 
in the early 1990s by the Shanghai Stock Exchange [30] and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) established in 19 December 1990 and 3 July 1991, respectively [31]. 
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The stock markets are currently managed by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC).  
The past three decades of financial market management and regulation have 
proven to be a steep learning curve. The Chinese stock markets in the present day 
continue to demonstrate many imperfections, including irrational behaviors of 
individual investors, poorly designed trading mechanisms, ineffective regulations, 
and flawed policy designs [32]. The combinations of these weaknesses have led to 
financial breakdowns, the latest one being the stock market crashes in 2015 and 
2016. In 12 June 2015, the SSE Composite Index reached its peak at 5,178 points, but 
dramatically fell to a record low at 3,373 points in 9 July, i.e. down 35 per cent within 
one month. During this period, the Growth Enterprise index saw a sharp decline of 
43 percent, moving downwards from 4,037 points to 2,304 points. Before 
mid-September 2015, more than 1,000 stocks experienced a limit-down for 16 times 
[33]. Individual investors lost confidence and the market ran into a chaos. Many 
stocks suffered from liquidity issue and could not be sold [34, 35]. Managing the 
massive volatility of financial market has become a pressing issue for Chinese 
regulators and policymakers.     
The most devastating financial policy failure in recent years is related to the 
‘Circuit Breaker Mechanism’ (CBM) introduced by the CSRC. The circuit breaker halts 
trading if the ‘Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 Index’ drops by a prescribed number of 
points for a prescribed amount of time. The CBM took effect from 4 January 2016. 
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On its very first day of operation, the Shanghai stock market was put under 
enormous pressure of short selling and the SSE Composite Index quickly went 
downwards.  In the afternoon (1pm), the index fell by 5 per cent and 7 per cent in 
about 20 minutes, triggering the first two levels of breaker. The market was forced 
to a temporary closure, and transactions in SSE, SZSE, and China Financial Futures 
Exchange were suspended in the rest of the day. During the first four business days 
of the 2016 New Year, more than 1,000 stocks in the A-stock market experienced a 
limit-down. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets shrunk by 7.41 trillion yuan 
(approx. USD1.13 trillion), and investors lost about 110,000 yuan on average (approx. 
USD16,796) [36]. The CSRC decided to suspend the CBM in the evening of 7 January 
2016, after only four days of operation. The striking event broke two records in 
China’s financial history: the shortest duration of transaction in one day and the 
shortest duration of a major financial policy intervention [37].  
Although the CBM did not contribute to these market crashes, it has 
demonstrated the failure of Chinese authorities in stabilizing the fast-growing 
financial market and operating new regulatory mechanisms. The problems 
associated with the Chinese financial market raise concern about the functioning of 
the burgeoning carbon market in China, which resembles the stock market in many 
aspects [38]. Shenzhen, which is home to a major domestic stock market and has 
experienced market crashes at different times, was designated to run the first 
carbon ETS in China.   
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2.2 Shenzhen City and its ETS 
In 2011, the Chinese central government formally appointed two provinces 
(Guangdong and Hubei) and five municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, 
and Shenzhen) to run trial ETSs. Shenzhen City is different from the other six 
jurisdictions as it is the only one not being directly administered by the central 
government, but by the Guangdong Provincial Government. Located in the Pearl 
River Delta and adjacent to Hong Kong, Shenzhen is a highly urbanized and 
industrialized megacity with a total population of over 11.4 million in 2015 and a per 
capita GDP of USD24,393 in 2015 (Table 1). It was the first designated Special 
Economic Zone of China granted by the central government a number of 
administrative and economic privileges, and is a major regional manufacturing 
center with a prospering tertiary sector. Despite the declining share of 
emission-intensive manufacturing sector, Shenzhen has recorded a relatively high 
level of GHG emissions, i.e. 153 MtCO2e in 2012, or 1.4 per cent of China’s total, 
while its population only accounts for 0.8 per cent of the total. 
Shenzhen officially launched its ETS in June 2013, meaning that the system 
for regulation and trading was set up within less than two years after the central 
government offering political mandate to the pilot ETSs in October 2011. The 
Shenzhen ETS was granted a legislative basis by the Standing Committee of 
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Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress through an authoritative policy document 
‘Provisions of Carbon Emissions Management of the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone’, which was released in October 2012 [39]. The city’s administration, formally 
known as Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government, made public the operational 
requirements and rules of the ETS by issuing the ‘Shenzhen Provisional Regulation on 
Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading’ in March 2014 – nine months after the ETS came into 
force [40].   
  
3. Research problems to address 
3.1 Overview of current knowledge 
There has been a well-established knowledge base about the implementation of 
ETSs in developed economies [41-43]. However, those schemes established by 
developing economies through domestic legislation remain poorly understood. 
Among these economies, China is currently the only one that can offer lessons for 
others in similar situations. Yet, most of the existing studies about Chinese ETSs are 
limited to their regulatory and management aspects. 
 Since the seven Chinese ETSs began operation in 2013 and 2014, many local 
scholars have raised question about the fundamental issues affecting their 
functioning. Mao et al. and Zhao et al., for example, are concerned about access to 
GHG emissions data and contend that the data management system in China is far 
12 
 
from complete and consistent [14, 23]. Few regulated entities have complete 
records on their GHG emissions [16, 21]. The limited availability and poor quality of 
emissions data render the setting of emissions caps arbitrary and disputable. As 
Munning et al. have indicated, the lack of understanding of business-as-usual 
emissions has increased the difficulties for regulators and firms to know whether the 
cap will bind or to predict future allowance prices [22]. Parties involved in allowance 
trading find no solid information basis for making investment and hedging risks 
against adverse changes in market conditions. 
 Another key issue that has attracted criticisms by local scholars is the lack of a 
robust regulatory system [12, 17, 18, 21]. Allowance-based carbon markets are 
regulation-driven. Legislation is imperative to establishing the legal status of 
emission permits or allowances. Enforcement and punishment are required in the 
event of non-compliance or misconduct, where permits are not surrendered as 
stipulated, prescribed trading rules are violated, or data reporting is found to be 
misleading. China’s regulatory infrastructure for CO2 emission trading is far from 
complete. There are considerable challenges in setting up a consistent and 
transparent monitoring, reporting and verification system in China [22, 23], where 
legal enforcement is constantly a problem confronting all levels of the society. 
Currently, there are no national regulations specifically for emission trading, and the 
on-going ETS programme proceeds as an administrative operation [18, 21]. 
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 Some empirical studies have shown that the lack of a robust regulatory system 
has discouraged business participation. For instance, Zhao et al. find that regulated 
enterprises are “unaware of operation rules and running process of carbon market” 
[14, p. 1241]. Even they are aware of these, many of them tend to believe that local 
governments are not serious about enforcing compliance [4]. Shen echoes this 
comment by suggesting that some of the big and powerful enterprises could find 
ways for evading penalties for their excess GHG emissions and failure to surrender 
allowances, particularly at the local level [19].  Although many new regulatory 
measures have been introduced over the last two years [12, 16], their impacts on 
business participation and investors’ confidence are yet to be seen. 
 A possible outcome of these weaknesses in market regulation and management 
is the poor performance of the carbon market in delivering economic efficiency. In 
particular, abnormal changes in allowance price are regarded as an indication of the 
failure of market to function efficiently as economic theory predicts. Many studies 
have attempted to identify these changes by modelling emission permits price, and 
they can be divided into three approaches according to their analytical focus.  
Some researchers focus on the price determinants of allowances in the EU ETS 
or other mature carbon markets [44-50].  They found that there are long-run 
relationships between emission allowance prices and external factors, such as 
weather, energy prices and economic shocks, but the presence of these relationships 
varies by sample and time, requiring longer-term market data to forecast. Since the 
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Shenzhen ETS has a relatively short history of operation (three years), this pricing 
model does not fit our study. Some other researchers put their emphasis on 
identifying the interactive impacts between carbon spot price and futures price [51, 
52]. However, this approach is not feasible for our analysis because futures are 
currently not available for trading in Chinese carbon markets.  
The third approach involves the use of different econometrics techniques to 
test the short-term behaviours of allowance spot prices [53-59]. The GARCH model 
was advocated by Benz and Trück [54] and experimented by themselves and other 
scholars [53, 55, 58], and all of these researchers have reported statistically 
satisfactory results in capturing the price volatility in the international carbon 
markets. Very few studies have explored the financial aspects of a Chinese ETS. Our 
inquiry searched for such market abnormalities by processing the GARCH model to 
examine the three-year spot price behaviour of Shenzhen ETS CO2 allowance, and 
attempted to assess an actual outcome of this policy intervention from a financial 
perspective.  
 
3.2 Research hypothesis 
This empirical study aimed at investigating the functioning of a carbon market by 
examining price behaviour. The analysis is based on the autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA)-GARCH-M model (described below), which is commonly used for 
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assessing the returns of financial products, especially stock returns, and their 
volatility, which is taken as a measure of risk [25, 60, 61]. In economics, emission 
allowances are understood as a form of property rights and assets that display 
certain financial properties when they are exchanged in markets [54, 62, 63]. One of 
the key properties is a broadly symmetric relationship between expected risk and 
asset return [26, 64]. As the variance of asset returns can be used to explain 
expected risk [65], the coefficient between returns and the conditional variance of 
returns can describe risk premium. In an efficient stock market, perceived risk of 
investment would run parallel to expected gains; thus risk premium is a function of 
expected risks, i.e. the parameter of risk premium should be positive. Most 
applications of GARCH-M model find that transactions in a properly functioning stock 
market demonstrate a positive correlation between these two elements, namely, 
yield and its conditional variance [25, 66, 67]. 
 Our assumption about the Shenzhen ETS was that the trade prices of emission 
allowance should demonstrate this financial property. This is because an ETS creates 
a market institution, typically resembling a stock market. Shenzhen was chosen for 
the case study as its ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme is regarded as better than the other six 
Chinese ETSs, because it is more market-oriented, active, and properly designed, has 
acquired a more solid legal basis, and has the longest history (i.e. experience) of 
operation. Our hypothesis is that expected returns in Shenzhen’s allowance-based 
market positively correlate with its volatility. Evidence for the otherwise case would 
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suggest that this market remains immature on this dimension and therefore requires 
regulatory attention and economic fixes.        
 
4.  Methods 
4.1 Data collection 
The data used in the analysis were the daily records on allowance price and trading 
volume. They were collected from the official website of the Shenzhen Emissions 
Exchange (SEE) (www.cerx.cn), where emission allowances issued by the Shenzhen 
ETS are traded. Records for the three full compliance years of Shenzhen ETS i.e. 2013 
- 2015 from the first day of ETS operation (18 June 2013) to the end of 2015 
compliance year (30 June 2016) There were 705 valid trading days during this 
three-year period.     
The sample included the daily average prices of three main types of emission 
allowances available for trading in the SEE (namely, SZA 2013, SZA 2014, and SZA 
2015). The daily average price is calculated by dividing the total trading turnover by 
the total trading volume in a particular day. Closing price was not included in the 
analysis, because the relatively small number of daily transactions makes them 
poorly representative. The statistical models for analyzing the daily records on 
average price and trading volume over past three years are specified in the next 
sub-section.  
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4.2 Statistical modelling 
A time series { 𝑦𝑡 } could be presented by the following equation [68]: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,  .............................................................................. (1)   
In equation (1), the variances of stochastic error terms { 𝜀𝑡 } are not a constant 
but a function depending on time, which is the ℎ𝑡 below. The variance of error 
terms would be severely undervalued if heteroscedasticity is ignored, which would 
result in errors in the significance tests of parameters and render all tests ineffective. 
These problems would significantly affect the fitting results of simulation. To solve 
the problem of heteroscedasticity, Engle [69] created the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model to more precisely assess the heteroscedasticity 
function. To simplify the higher-order ARCH model and optimize empirical processes, 
Bollerslev [70] took both heteroscedasticity and its autoregressive problem into 
consideration and proposed a new and more general class of processes, called 
‘generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity’ (GARCH) model. The 
GARCH (𝑘, 𝑙) can be specified as: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,  .............................................................................. (1)   
 ℎ𝑡 = ℎ(𝜀𝑡−1, … , 𝜀𝑡−𝑞),    𝜀𝑡|𝛺𝑡−1 ~ 𝑁(0,ℎ𝑡), .................................... (2) 
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 𝜀𝑡 = �ℎ𝑡𝜎𝑡 , 𝜎𝑡 ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.𝑁(0,1), ............................................................. (3) 
 ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−22 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝑘𝜀𝑡−𝑘2 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑙ℎ𝑡−𝑙,   .................................................................................................................................. (4) 
where ℎ( ) is a non-negative function, according to (2)(3), which determines the 
structure of conditional variances,  Ωt−1  represents the set of all information 
before the moment of t . And, 𝛼0 is a constant term, 𝛼𝑘 is the coefficient of the 
𝑘-order ARCH term, which is 𝜀𝑡−𝑘2, 𝛽𝑙 is the coefficient of the 𝑙 -order GARCH 
term, which is ℎ𝑡−𝑙. A stable GARCH (𝑘, 𝑙) requires: 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0 (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑘); 𝛽𝑗 ≥0 (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑙); ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝑗=1 < 1. When 𝑘 and 𝑙 are both 1, the model is 
the GARCH (1,1).  
ARCH-in-mean (ARCH-M) was proposed by Engle and Lilien [30] in 1987 to 
reflect risk premium by introducing a heteroscedasticity term indicating the effect of 
risk of the return into the mean equation. GARCH-M model is a modification of the 
ARCH-M model by adding the GARCH term into the conditional variance function. 
Therefore, to present the time series of the return {𝑟𝑡} and introduce its risk by {ℎ𝑡}, 
the mean equation (1) in GARCH-M model of {𝑟𝑡} can be written as: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,  ................................................................... (5)   
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The autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model was proposed by Box et al. [71] 
for modelling a time-varying time series. Thus the equation (1) of the time series 
{ 𝑦𝑡 } applied by the ARMA (𝑝, 𝑞) model can be specified as: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝑎𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑞 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝜀𝑡−2 + ⋯+
𝑏𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑡, ............................................................................................................................ (6) 
where 𝑎0 is a constant term,  𝑦𝑡−𝑞 is the lagged variable of 𝑦𝑡 ,which can be 
called an autoregressive term, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at the moment of t, which 
can be called a moving average term.  𝑎𝑝  is the coefficient of the 𝑝 -order 
autoregressive terms and 𝑏𝑞 is the coefficient of the 𝑞-order moving average term. 
Based on the equation (5) (6), to consider the ARMA process in to the 
GARCH-M model of {𝑟𝑡}, the mean equation of ARMA (𝑝, 𝑞)-GARCH -M model is: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑞 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝜀𝑡−2 + ⋯+
𝑏𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞 + 𝛾ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, ........................................................................................................ (7) 
Therefore, the ARMA (𝑝, 𝑞)-GARCH (𝑘, 𝑙)-M model can be specified as: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑞 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝜀𝑡−2 + ⋯+
𝑏𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞 + 𝛾ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, ........................................................................................................ (7) 
 ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−22 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝑘𝜀𝑡−𝑘2 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑙ℎ𝑡−𝑙,   .................................................................................................................................. (4) 
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where 𝛾 is the parameter of risk premium, which is the level of impact on return 
series 𝑟𝑡  from anticipatable risk calculated by conditional variance  ℎ𝑡   and 
represent the relationship between expected risk and expected return. 
Benz and Trück have used the GARCH model  capturing CO2 allowances 
price volatility [54]. They conducted an empirical analysis of EUA prices in the first 
two years of EU ETS, and showed that the plot of spot prices and returns 
demonstrated asymmetry, excess kurtosis or heavy tails. Benz and Trück [54] 
suggested that the main barrier to overcome in further analysis was the lack of 
adequate amount of data. Subsequently, these researchers applied the AR-GARCH 
model to two different short periods, namely, in-sample and out-of-sample, of EUA 
spot prices and log-return. They come to the conclusion that the GARCH model 
significantly outperforms the model with constant variance, and can be regarded as 
an adequate approach for modelling emission allowance log-return [55].  
Another group of researchers employed various kinds of GARCH-type 
structure to examine the behaviours of two different kinds of emission allowance, i.e. 
CO2 allowances in the EU ETS and the SO2 allowances in the US CAAA [58]. In their 
2006 working paper [57], Paolella and Taschini discussed in detail the methodology 
for exploring price scenarios in emission market. To address the “zeros-problem” (i.e. 
high presence of zeros) in the log-return series of SO2 allowances, they proposed a 
sophisticated and improved GARCH-type model, namely, n-component MixN-GARCH 
implemented in Matlab. But for the CO2 allowances series, there are less zeros 
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presented in its return time series (in their sample, 3 out of the 337 log-returns were 
zero, while in our sample, it is 10 of 704). In their view, the conventional GARCH 
model can be utilized in the CO2 allowances series without the “zeros-problem”. This 
lends support to the use of the standard GARCH model in our study to analyze the 
process of CO2 allowances in Shenzhen.  
Based on previous empirical studies, Benschop and Cabrera [53] have made a 
further exploration on the GARCH process to model the EUA spot prices. They 
proposed an improved combined model, namely, Markov regime switching 
(MS)-GARCH model and made a comparison about the sample fitting performance of 
different models. They found that the MS-AR-GARCH model had the best sample fit 
according to the log likelihood and AIC, but this process would create a greater 
number of parameters in model than simple AR-GARCH i.e. 18 and 8 separately in 
their findings. Therefore, our empirical analysis adopted the AR-GARCH technique, 
instead of the MS-AR-GARCH.  
As a normal expansion of GARCH model, GARCH-M has been widely used in 
the research of risk premium of financial market, especially the stock market [61, 
72-74]. There are also many studies on the relationship between risk and return of 
bulk commodities, such as oil prices [75] and agricultural products prices [76, 77]. 
Moreover, the ARMA-GARCH-M approaches have been employed to model the 
mean and volatility of wind speed [78]. However, few studies have used the 
GARCH-M model to examine the risk premium of emission allowance. To fill this 
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knowledge gap, the present research expanded the GARCH to GARCH in mean to 
examine our research hypothesis as followed. 
These studies suggest that the GARCH model and its variants are useful for 
understanding the financial performance of carbon markets. None of them, however, 
involves the allowance-based market in China. We used the abovementioned 
technique for our Chinese study and produced the following results.  
 
5 Results 
5.1 The data  
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the sample, including trading volume, 
turnover, and average price. From June 2013 to June 2016, a total of 15.7 million 
tonnes of CO2 were traded in the SEE at a historical average price of 50.66 yuan 
(CNY/USD at the rate of 0.15 as of 30 June 2016). It is worthwhile noting that the 
mean values of trading volume and turnover are remarkably higher than the median 
values. The observations exhibit skewness and excess kurtosis, suggesting that the 
trading volume and turnover are leptokurtic and the fluctuations are highly 
concentrated.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the volatility behavior of trading volume and turnover, 
respectively. Clear fluctuations were found during two periods of time, namely, 
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between January 2015 and July 2015, and between November 2015 and February 
2016; otherwise the trading volume was low and steady. There were more trading 
activities in the second half of the three-year study period (January 2015 – June 2016) 
than the first half (June 2013 – December 2014). Abnormalities were observed 
throughout the immediate past six months. Several transactions recorded in early 
2016 were exceedingly large. The extreme ones, recorded in 21 March 2016 and 8 
June 2016, reached 4 million tonnes and 3.6 million tonnes, respectively1. These two 
unusually large deals account for nearly half (25 per cent and 23 per cent 
respectively) of the three-year total.   
Daily average prices of emission allowances ranged from 21.5 yuan in 9 July 
2015 to 123 yuan in 17 October 2013. The prices moved upwards in the inception of 
the ETS and became volatile toward the end of 2013 (Figure 3). Price movements 
became stable after late 2014, moving within the range of 20 yuan and 50 yuan. 
Since then, the market demonstrated more stability than the earlier period. This is 
probably because the first official compliance year of the ETS finished in the end of 
the second quarter of 2014. Market participants had experienced a learning process 
since July and gained better understanding about market supply and demand as well 
as compliance requirements and regulatory practice. The learning process continued 
in the first half of 2016, stabilizing the price movement within the range of 25 yuan, 
or approx. US$3 (i.e. between 25 yuan to 50 yuan).   
                                                          
1 We have cross-checked with the SEE’s official publications and found that both of these 
transactions are noted as such in its weekly summaries.  
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5.2 Time series analysis 
To satisfy the stationarity requirement of time series in the GARCH model, we used 
log-returns of daily average prices for showing their volatility behavior. The 
log-returns are the first difference of the logarithm of prices can be calculated by this 
formula: 𝑅𝑡 = 100 ∗ ln(𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1), where 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡−1 are the average allowance 
prices of on day 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 respectively. The Eviews Version 7 was used to build 
the ARMA-GARCH and ARMA-GARCH-M models for the log-returns of prices.  
The time plot of the log-returns series for the entire study period is presented 
in Figure 4. It shows that volatility varies with time, and there are heteroscedasticity 
and volatility clustering. The descriptive statistics for log-returns and the result of the 
three kinds of stationarity test are reported in Table 3. The skewness parameter is 
positive (0.275), indicating that the time series is right-skewed. The kurtosis 
parameter (7.201) well exceeds 3, suggesting leptokurtosis and fat-tails.  The 
Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics, which is used to check for normality, rejects the null 
hypothesis that the log-returns are normally distributed. The Augmented 
Dickey–Fuller(ADF) test [79] and Philips-Perron[80] test [81] statistics is -21.04327 
and -60.53277, greater than the critical value and significant at the 1% level, thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root. To confirm the stationarity 
of the series, we conducted the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test [82]. 
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Results showed that the null hypothesis of a stationary process is not rejected. This 
suggests that the log-returns can be described as a stationary financial time series 
and satisfy the stationarity requirement of the GARCH model.  
We used the ARMA-GARCH and ARMA-GARCH-M to model the time series. 
The first step was constructing an ARMA model and identifying the orders of the 
autoregressive and moving average terms based on the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) [83], Schwarz Criterion (SC) [84] and log likelihood measures. We created and 
tested the nine different ARMA models: AR (1); MA (1); AR (1) and MA (1); AR (1), AR 
(2), and MA (1); AR (1), MA (1) and MA (2); AR (1), AR (2), MA (1) and MA (2); AR (1), 
AR (2), AR (3), MA (1) and MA (2); AR (1), AR (2), MA (1), MA (2) and MA (3); AR (1), 
AR (2), AR (3), MA (1), MA (2) and MA (3). The result of AIC, SC and log likelihood are 
shown in the Table 3. For AIC statistics, the smallest value is 7.5074, pointing the 
optimal choice is ARMA (3,2); for SC statistics, the smallest value is 7.5348 pointing 
the optimal choice is ARMA (1,2); and for R-squared and adjusted R-Squared, the 
largest value at 0.2705 and 0.2653, both pointing the optimal choice is ARMA (3,2).  
Generally, the optimal structure of the ARMA model for this time series is 
ARMA (3,2).For GARCH, we chose a basic and commonly used GARCH model, i.e. 
GARCH (1,1). This model is suitable for analyzing the log-return time series of the 
price of emission allowances, which can be regarded as a financial asset, and 
investigating and forecasting its time-varying dynamics pattern. The ARMA (3,2)- 
GARCH (1,1) model can be written as:  
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Mean equation: 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑡−2 + 𝑎3𝑟𝑡−3 + 𝑏1𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝜀𝑡−2, 
Variance equation: ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡−1, 
By adding a heteroscedasticity term in the mean equation, the ARMA (3,2)- GARCH 
(1,1)-M model can be specified as:  
Mean equation: 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎1′ 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑎2′ 𝑟𝑡−2 + 𝑎3′ 𝑟𝑡−3 + 𝑏1′𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝑏2′ 𝜀𝑡−2 + 𝛾ℎ𝑡 , 
Variance equation: ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼0′ + 𝛼1′ 𝜀𝑡−12 + 𝛽1′ℎ𝑡−1, 
where 𝛾 is the parameter of the relationship between the returns of emission 
allowance as a financial asset and its conditional variance (heteroscedasticity term) 
reflecting the uncertainty of return or expected risk.  This coefficient is the 
trade-off of risk return. The underlying assumption is that financial assets that incur 
higher risks are likely to yield higher returns, which compensate for bearing risk. 
Thus, high volatility of an effective financial market is expected to generate a risk 
premium for assets [30]. 
Results of ARMA-GARCH modelling are reported in Table 4. In the variance 
equation, the coefficients of  𝛼1 and 𝛽1 are positive and their p-values show they 
are significant at the level of 1 %, indicating that the ARMA-GARCH model is 
statistically robust. The sum of 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 is 0.987, which is below but close to 1, 
satisfying the assumption of GARCH, which demonstrates a long-term memory in the 
volatility of returns or price dynamics due to the impacts of shocks from news [85]. 
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Overall, the results show that the time series of returns have a GARCH effect and 
follow the normal pattern of volatility, like a form of a financial asset. 
Results of ARMA-GARCH-M modelling are reported in Table 5. In the variance 
equation, the coefficients of 𝛼1′  and 𝛽1′  are also positive and their p-values show 
they are significant at the level of 1 %, indicating that the ARMA-GARCH-M model is 
statistically robust. The sum of 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 is 0.992, meaning that it is a stable model. 
In the mean equation, however, the coefficient of 𝛾 has a negative sign (-0.010) and 
is significant at the 5% level. This means that a one-unit increase in risk (i.e. the 
conditional variance of returns) is associated with a decline in returns by 0.010 unit. 
That is, there is a negative relationship between expected yield and expected risk. 
 
5.3   Comparison with other findings 
In Section 3.1, we have indicated that existing studies on emission allowance prices 
have different analytic emphases. A common finding among those focusing on price 
determinants is that structural breaks exist in the price sequences of EUAs. These 
structural breaks could be explained by regulatory change [46] or market 
participants’ expectations [47]. As carbon futures are currently not available in 
Chinese carbon markets, the findings of studies focusing on the relationship between 
spot and futures prices have little relevance for our studies. Nonetheless, this will 
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become a potentially important research topic when the carbon futures market 
begins operation in China.  
Some studies sought to capture the stochastic of price behaviour of CO2 permits. 
For example, Daskalakis et al. [56] have found a highly discontinuous price jump in 
2006 and non-stationarity in spot and futures data in European markets (i.e. 
Powernext, Nord Pool and ECX), and suggested that the main reason is the 
restriction of banking in the early stages of the EU ETS. We did not find an clear-cut 
price break in Shenzhen’s carbon allowance data, but only a general decline in price 
and high volatility. Seifert et al. [59]reported a brief empirical analysis of the return 
series of EUA, which demonstrated low autocorrelations. Our empirical results have 
also identified a similar autocorrelative effect of return series in Shenzhen. Moreover, 
our statistical strategy was informed by Paolella and Taschini(Mixed-normal GARCH) 
[58], Benz and Trück (Markov switching and GARCH ) [55] and Benschop and Cabrera 
(MS-GARCH) [53]. Both the findings of these previous studies and ours have 
indicated heteroscedasticity and heavy tail in the allowance price series with 
fluctuation cluster. However, our research contributes to knowledge by expanding 
the GARCH process to GARCH-M to the log-return series, and producing a negative 
coefficient between return and the expected risk reflected by the conditional 
variance, which is intuitively intriguing.  
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6 Discussion  
The results reported above provide mixed evidence for our research hypothesis. We 
found that the volatility of allowance prices in Shenzhen does correlate with the rate 
of expected asset returns, but in the opposite way, i.e. asset returns are negatively 
associated with risk premium. This suggests that expected gains decline as risks 
increase, standing at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market and the 
prediction of asset pricing theory [80]. In addition, significant fluctuations and 
excessively high kurtosis were found in the records of trading volume. Several block 
trades were concentrated in a few days, while the daily trading volume over a 
three-year period was modest. The two outliners, reported in Figure 1 above, appear 
to be an unusual market movement driven by private negotiations between 
institutional buyers and sellers. The fact that these bulk transactions account for 
nearly half of the total trading volume across the three-year period raises question 
about market liquidity and market domination by a handful of participants.  
 The observed price pattern can be seen as a possible outcome of the market 
imperfections in China. As Zhang [5] has indicated, emission allowances are over- 
allocated and there are considerable uncertainties regarding the duration of the 
validity of allowances as financial assets. Also, many enterprises tend to believe that 
the governments are not serious in enforcing compliance. As a consequence, they 
engage in emission trading only for compliance purposes and do not participate in 
emissions trading until the last minute. The lack of momentum in the Chinese carbon 
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market might result in abnormal movements in price and trading volume, such as 
the negative coefficient of GARCH-M model, single days with extremely high trading 
volume, and the declines in price, as demonstrated by our study.  
Although the Shenzhen ETS has advantages over the other six Chinese ETSs, it 
is yet to move beyond its primitive form of quasi-market. Without being able to 
eliminate concerns about financial maturity, our findings provide additional evidence 
about the limitations of the pilot ETSs operating in China, which is broadly consistent 
with earlier assessments reported elsewhere [14, 17-21]. There is a general 
consensus among researchers and practitioners that the Chinese ETSs currently do 
not demonstrate the properties of a well-functioning market [4, 5, 14, 21, 23]. The 
fact that they remain financially immature and result in price abnormalities may be 
explained in terms of market liquidity and information uncertainties.  
 The secondary market is poorly developed. At present, only spot trading is 
permitted, whereas futures and options are absent from the Chinese carbon market. 
The lack of opportunities for hedging and speculation from future price movements 
undermines incentives for diverting capital to this market. Instead, compliance with 
regulations is the main objective of engaging in emission trading. Most of the liable 
entities, largely state-owned entreprises, participate in emission trading for the 
reason of controlling their GHG emissions and meeting their compliance obligations, 
with little interest in turning it into an investment [21]. In fact, there is a general lack 
of knowledge about how carbon markets and trading systems work [19, 38, 86]. 
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Some of these entreprises managed to acquire a basic understanding about trading 
rules and carbon asset management, but “their [market] consciousness is weak and 
attitude is negative” [14, p]. 1241. Consequently, participation in emission trading is 
merely viewed as a responsibility, whereas the sense of investment remains weak.   
This viewpoint finds evidence from a market research report published in 
2014, which involves a survey of enterprises covered by the Shanghai ETS. The report 
shows that only 6% (9 out of 152) of these enterprises prepared to actively 
participate in trading, purchasing and selling emission allowances, whereas the rest 
assumed a passive role [27, p.62]. Many liable entities put their allocations into 
warehouse, rather than releasing them to the market. Investments account for only 
a handful of market transactions [14]. Small daily deals are driven by needs. 
On the other hand, many large deals involve government intervention. In the 
Chinese political economy, local and provincial governments have substantial 
influence over the private sector within their jurisdictions and are able to prompt 
companies to engage in ‘trading’ with each other. Liu, Chen [21] argue that emission 
trading in China is primarily driven by the administrative commands from the 
government. The first transactions in Beijing and Shanghai carbon exchanges were 
negotiated deals coordinated by local governments. As the prices were formed by 
agreement between two parties, they were far from competitive and played limited 
guiding role [21]. Non-market pressures offer a possible explanation for the 
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abnormal price behavior and the presence of unusual bulk transactions, which 
warrants further research to validate.  
Information uncertainties may also contribute to market abnormalities. In 
China, carbon emission data are far from complete and consistent [18, 23]. This 
increases difficulties for market participants to predict and speculate on relative 
demand and manage investment portfolios. Moreover, market participants tend to 
be conservative when a new market is formed. Liable entities with excess allowances 
hesitate to sell out, whereas those running short of allowances are keen on buying in. 
Thus, allowance supply and demand often move apart in the early days of business 
when the market and regulatory conditions (e.g. the abundance of allowances and 
auction arrangements) are uncertain to all parties, including investors and brokers 
[27, p.64]. The declining supply and growing demand may result in a price surge. To 
date, this issue remains unresolved as little information about the prospective 
national ETS has been released and the future of the pilot ETSs remains uncertain.  
 
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study examined the volatility behavior of the emission allowances changed 
hands under the Shenzhen ETS in China. Its novelty lies in the use of the 
ARMA-GARCH-M technique for modelling asset returns series and analysing 
allowance price data recorded in China. We found that the rate of return was 
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negatively associated with expected risk represented by the conditional variance, 
and this stands at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market. In addition, 
there were significant fluctuations and excessively high kurtosis in trading volume. 
Although the Shenzhen ETS has been operating for more than three years since June 
2013 and has many advantages over its counterparts in China, more work is needed 
to turn it into a mature market in which yield would normally increase with volatility.   
The findings call for regulatory attention and economic fixes to improve the 
efficiency of this carbon market and eliminate sources of market distortions, such as 
excessive state intervention into market activities and restrictions on trading options. 
Currently in China, not many enterprises and investors have expressed a strong 
interest in trading emission allowances for profits. Instead, state intervention and 
regulation are the most important factor affecting allowance prices [27, p.66]. As 
details about the important national ETS are not yet available, uncertainties 
associated with strengthening state intervention and introducing new regulatory 
arrangements are likely to persist. Until the scheme is successfully implemented and 
the regulatory system is made transparent, market abnormalities, as we have 
identified, may continue to exist. 
As a policy experiment, the pilot ETSs form a basis for building a nationwide 
scheme and offer lessons to learn. Understanding the properties and imperfections 
of the Chinese carbon market are important for advancing the performance of the 
carbon markets in China and potentially those in other developing countries that 
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consider emission trading as part of the policy mix. Based on our observations, we 
provide a few recommendations for policymakers in China and other developing 
countries.  
Firstly, more financial innovations are needed to increase the liquidity of 
China’s carbon market. Derivatives and other financial products that allow 
speculations are in short supply, due to regulatory restrictions. Providing a variety of 
financial products is important for attracting investments and hedging risks, thus 
increasing the liquidity and economic efficiency of the carbon market. Secondly, 
relevant government agencies, notably the NDRC, should scale up current efforts on 
building capacity all cross the country, and not only in the provinces and cities 
running the pilot ETSs. A better understanding about how to manage their 
allocations and acquire emission allowances from the market could help participants 
from lower-tier provinces and cities to more actively engage in nationwide emission 
trading and increase market activities. Thirdly, the ETS regulators should review the 
practice of information disclosure by entreprises and investors. Reliable and accurate 
information about major transactions is crucial for facilitating capital flows and 
supporting investment decision-making.  
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Table 1 Key features of Shenzhen City and Shenzhen Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) 
Shenzhen City  
Total Population (2015) 
(percentage of country)1 
11.4 million (0.8%) 
GDP (2015) (percentage of 
country)1 
USD270.2 billion (2.6%) 
GDP per capita1 USD24,393 
Overall GHG emissions (excluding 
LULUCF) (2012) (percentage of 
country)2 
153 MtC02e (1.4%) 
  
Shenzhen ETS  
Launch date 18 June 2013 
Cap on GHG emissions2 34.78 MtCO2e 
Percentage of GHG emissions 
covered by the ETS2 
40%  
Sectors covered2 Industries (power, water supply, manufacturing, 
etc.), buildings and transportation  
Number of liable entities2 635 enterprises, 197 public buildings 
Inclusion thresholds3 3,000t CO2e per year for enterprises;  
Large public buildings; 
10,000m2 for government buildings. 
Allowance allocation4 Industrial sectors: 95% free allocation, 3% 
auction, 2% reserve 
Buildings: 100% free allocation 
Trading mode Spot trading, block trades, negotiated transfers 
Banking and borrowing of Banking is allowed during the pilot phase. 
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allowances2 Borrowing not allowed. 
Offsets and credits4 Domestic project-based carbon offset credits — 
China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) — 
are allowed. The use of CCER credits is 
limited to 10% of the annual compliance 
obligation. Credits from hydro projects are 
not eligible and there are further geographic 
restrictions for the use of certain CCERs. 
Sources:  
1 National Bureau of Statistics of China (data.stats.gov.cn). The GDP estimates 
originally in Chinese yuan were converted to US dollars at the rate of 0.1544 
(CYN/USD) based on the Federal Reverse’s exchange rate records (31 December 
2015) 
2 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (icapcarbonaction.com) 
3 Shenzhen Municipal People's Government (2014). Shenzhen Provisional Regulation 
on Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading. Shenzhen: Shenzhen Municipal People's 
Government, People’s Republic of China. 
4 Jiang et al. (2014, p. 19) 
5 Shenzhen Municipal People's Government (2015). Shenzhen Provisional Regulation 
of Carbon Offset and Credits on Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading. Shenzhen: Shenzhen 
Municipal People's Government, People’s Republic of China. 
  
42 
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of trading records in Shenzhen (2013 – 2016) 
Item Mean 
Media
n 
Max Min Std. dev. 
Ske
w 
Kurt N 
Trading 
volume 
(Tonne) 
22,143 2,178 4,000,000 0 203,493 
18.5
1 
346.1
0 
70
5 
Turnove
r 
(CNY)^ 
762,74
4 
114,65
9 
100,000,00
0 
0 
5,136,07
6 
17.7
2 
325.9
9 
70
5 
Average 
price 
(CNY)^ 
50.66 42 122.97 
21.4
7 
18.20 0.87 -0.12 
70
5 
^ CNY/USD at the rate of 0.15 based on the Federal Reverse’s exchange rate records 
(30 June 2016) 
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Figure 1 Daily trading volume of emission allowances in Shenzhen (2013 – 2016) 
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Figure 2 Daily turnover of emission allowances in Shenzhen (2013 – 2016) 
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Figure 3 Daily average price of emission allowances in Shenzhen (2013 – 2016) 
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Figure 4 Log-return series of emission allowances in Shenzhen (2013 – 2016)
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics of log-return series and ADF test result 
Statistic Value 
Mean -0.002 
Median 0.000 
Maximum 60.710 
Minimum -59.737 
Std. Dev. 12.012 
Skewness 0.275 
Kurtosis 7.201 
Jarque-Bera 526.554 
Probability 0 
Observations 704 
ADF test1 -21.04327*** 
 
1 *** means significant at 1 % level of critical value and critical value at 1 % level, 5 % level 
and 10 % level are -3.43945, -2.865446 and -2.568907 respectively. 
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Table 4 Results of ARMA-GARCH modelling  
 
Mean Equation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
𝑎0 -0.097  0.057  -1.715  0.086  
𝑎1 1.143  0.046  24.697  0.000  
𝑎2 -0.114  0.069  -1.649  0.099  
𝑎3 -0.096  0.043  -2.258  0.024  
𝑏1 -1.569  0.009  -177.942  0.000  
𝑏2 0.582  0.011  51.763  0.000  
Variance Equation 
𝛼0 5.519  0.991  5.571  0.000  
𝛼1 0.279  0.040  7.063  0.000  
𝛽1 0.708  0.029  24.331  0.000  
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Table 5 Results of ARMA-GARCH-M modelling  
 
Mean Equation 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z-Statistic Prob. 
𝛾 -0.010  0.005  -1.950  0.051  
𝑎1
′  0.935  0.049  19.065  0.000  
𝑎2
′  -0.022  0.063  -0.357  0.722  
𝑎3
′  -0.044  0.040  -1.079  0.281  
𝑏1
′  -1.372  0.019  -74.089  0.000  
𝑏2
′  0.399  0.014  29.229  0.000  
Variance Equation 
𝛼0
′  5.572  0.974  5.723  0.000  
𝛼1
′  0.296  0.042  7.029  0.000  
𝛽1
′  0.696  0.030  23.044  0.000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
